Japan's banking: The darkest hour before dawn: The future is in the hands of MoF by Ohara, Yukiko
Japan's Banking: The Darkest Hour Before Dawn 
The Future is in the Hands of MoF 
Yukiko Ohara 
Working Paper No. 127 
Working Paper Series 
Center on Japanese Economy and Business 
Columbia Business School 
September 1996 
Japan's Banking: The Darkest Hour Before Dawn 
The Future is in the Hands of MoF 
Yukiko Ohara 
UBS Securities Tokyo Research 
This paper was presented at the conference Emerging Trends in Japanese Financial 
Markets held at Columbia University on December 8-9, 1995. The conference was 
sponsored by the Center on Japanese Economy and Business and organized by Professor 
Yasushi Hamao. 
Abstract 
Public funds essential to solving the crisis 
The current crisis in the financial system can only be solved quickly, and relatively easily, 
if the Ministry of Finance (MoF) acknowledged the need for injecting public funds into 
the system. MoF, however, also needs a political consensus on the issue. Any 
alternative, which relies heavily or exclusively on the strong banks, will be vehemently 
opposed by the healthy faction of the financial system. Any delay in solving the crisis 
through public funds will lead to a more expensive solution, with more casualties. A 
crisis feeling, therefore, seems to have developed recognizing that the status quo is 
untenable. As such, change, good or bad, is inevitable, and the next year will present the 
system with a very critical challenge, that may well prove to be the last opportunity for 
positive action. Again, positive action can only mean the use of public funds alongside 
private funds. The deflationary pressure on the economy continues to cause 
complications in resolving the banking crisis. Therefore, reversing deflation quickly is 
essential to helping the financial system deal with its problems. There are signs that the 
authorities are starting to act in the right direction, although the scope, size and timeliness 
of intervention remains to be seen. 
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Main points: cost of rescue, timing and participants 
(1) Outline: 
The Ministry of Finance' s (MoF) estimate for financial institutions' overall bad debt stood at 
¥40 trillion as of March 1995. At this level, UBS Securities considers that the bad debt 
problem can be solved by private financial institutions' own resources and would probably not 
need the injection of public funds in order to dispose of bankruptcies and absorb bad debt. 
However, one should note that there are many problem borrowers not currently included in 
the MoF's definition of bad debts that have received strong financial support by lender banks. 
The bad debt and bankruptcy disposal process will take several years, during which time 
disposal costs will continue to increase. In the meantime, the future of the banking crisis lies 
in the hands of the MoF: public funds will be needed to avert a full blown crisis through aiding 
the private banking sector in absorbing bad debt and the cost of bankruptcies. Inaction will 
have the opposite effect, so that any resolution to the problem will not only be more difficult, 
but prohibitively expensive, too. 
(2) Five different bad debt simulations : 
UBS Securities has estimated the capital deficits of Japanese financial institutions under five 
different bad debt scenarios ranging from ¥40 trillion to ¥95 trillion. In the ¥40 trillion 
scenario, hardly any capital deficit (under-capitalisation) would be seen. However, it is likely 
that in a ¥75 trillion scenario (UBS standard scenario) the capital deficit would expand rapidly 
and some of the 21 major baaks would face solvency problems. 
(3) Postponing the disposal process by one year: 
A new formula for disposing of bankruptcies which the Financial System Research Committee 
(FSRC, advisory council to the Minister of Finance) has been discussing for the last few 
months is unlikely to be implemented for about a year. In the meantime, the Deposit 
Insurance Corporation of Japan (DICJ) does not have adequate funds available for disposal 
costs. Therefore, the authorities will have no choice but to postpone the disposal process by 
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around one year. As has already been experienced, postponing disposals will be the primary 
factor that turns potential bad debts into actual bad debts that finally need to be written off. 
(4) A disposal procedure that relies heavily on private sector earnings will not succeed: 
Can the funds for the disposal of bankrupt institutions be collected within one year? According 
to the FSRC's interim report, private-sector financial institutions should, in theory, bear as 
much as is feasible of the costs of disposing of bankruptcies. In our ¥75 trillion scenario, 
private-sector financial institutions would have to bear about ¥7 trillion on the disposal of 
bankrupt institutions, about twice as much as in the ¥40 trillion scenario. Despite higher 
profits, it is expected that the earnings of the 21 major banks will be weakened for the next 
several years due to the disposal costs of their own bad debts as well as supporting other 
institutions through the Deposit Insurance Corporation's increased premia. Therefore, few 
banks will ignore their own shareholders and willingly pay out for the disposal of bankrupted 
institutions. As a result, it would be very difficult to start the disposal procedures that are due 
to begin in one year without injecting enough public funds. Regulators should commit the use 
of ample public funds as soon as possible in order to minimize increasing costs. UBS 
Securities considers that strong banks that are able to manage disposals on bad debts within 
one to two years will benefit most from such a reinforced banking policy, such as Mitsubishi 
Baak and Sanwa Bank. 
1. Calculating bad debts on a wider definition 
(1) Difference between UBS and MoF definitions 
MoF estimate of ¥40-50 trillion: 
The MoF's estimate for financial institutions' overall bad debt stood at ¥40 trillion as of March 
1995. Bad debt, as defined by the MoF, include all loans outstanding to bankrupt borrowers, 
those where payments have not been received for six months or more, and those where 
interest payments have been reduced to less than the level of the ODR at the major 21 banks, 
regional baaks, second-tier banks, shinkin baaks, credit cooperatives, Rodo Kinko, Shoko 
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Chukin Bank and Agricultural cooperatives-related financial institutions. According to the 
MoF, if we add loans where payments have stalled for over three months but less than six 
months (¥1-2 trillion), loans from agricultural cooperatives-related financial institutions to the 
housing loan companies (around ¥5.5 trillion) and loans where interest rates have been 
reduced but still exceed the ODR (¥1-2 trillion), the total comes to just under ¥50 trillion. The 
MoF also mentioned that in the near future bad debt at affiliated non-banks might become 
either loans with reduced interest payments or loans where payments have stalled at parent 
banks. 
UBS Securities estimate of ¥75 trillion: 
According to UBS Securities, however, bad debt stands at ¥75 trillion, (notel). The ¥20-30 
trillion difference lies principally in the definition of bad debt. In addition to the MoF's 
definition, UBS also includes: 
i) Subsidized loans where interest payments are still being made, or loans where interest 
payments have been reduced to not less than the level of ODR. 
ii) Loans to CCPC (Cooperative Credit Purchasing Company). This is an organisation set up 
by the baaks themselves to purchase real estate-backed loans from those baaks. It has 
effectively operated as a tax shelter since its inception. 
iii) Bad debts at affiliated non-banks that are financed by sources other than the parent banks. 
Of this ¥75 trillion, around ¥41 trillion is estimated to be at the major 21 banks (note2). 
(Table 1: Bad debt at the 21 major banks) 
Note 1. For financial institutions other than the 21 major banks, bad debts has been calculated by 
estimating the bad debt ratio per institution type (such as regional banks, credit cooperatives). 
Note 2. Bad debt at the 21 major banks has been calculated by adding up all estimated problem loans. 
(2) Japan's financial system is short of ¥18 trillion in capital 
If bad debt stands at ¥75 trillion, then the real capital at Japanese financial institutions is 
around ¥28 trillion, about 2.4% of total assets (note 3). If we calculate that financial 
institutions need capital of around 4% to assets to run their businesses, this implies a required 
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capital as of March 1995 of ¥46 trillion. In order to close the gap between real capital and 
required capital, a further ¥18 trillion in funds needs to be injected in form of external capital. 
A number of financial institutions with funds shortages may already face solvency problems. 
In the above calculation, the real capital of financial institutions that have no problems with 
their balance sheets, and that do not need external funding, has also been included. In other 
words, real capital is the capital left after insolvent institutions have been taken over 
and absorbed by sound financial institutions. Taking the example given by the New Hyogo 
Bank (Midori Bank), the capital adequacy ratio has to be brought up to around the 4% level in 
order to continue operations after a bankruptcy. However, it is unrealistic to expect the 
problem of bankruptcies to be resolved by the healthy baaks merging with their failed 
counterparts, as the bad debt problem is spread nationwide. Therefore, external funds other 
than the real capital of the healthy banks could be required, possibly far exceeding ¥18 trillion 
if mergers would not be prove to be as popular a solution with the banks as is ideally the case. 
(Table 2: Japanese financial system short of ¥18 trillion in capital) 
Note 3. Real capital = equity capital + bad debt reserves + (unrealized profits on equities - losses on bad debts) 
x 45% (BIS-based ratio). 
(Real capital does not include subordinated debts. Losses on bad debts is the amount not covered by 
collateralized assets, and is taken as 60% of the book value of bad debts) 
2. Major 21 banks — Several more years needed to clear their own existing bad loans 
UBS Securities estimate of ¥40 trillion in bad loans for the major 21 banks includes a large 
number of potential bad debts. The MoF has set the time-frame for disposing of bad loans at 
five years, but it seems extremely likely that loans where interest payments are only being met 
through subsidies will turn into proper bad debts within the next five years. Furthermore, it 
seems inevitable that parent banks will ultimately have to take the responsibility for affiliated 
non-banks' bad debts, even if these non-banks are financed by funds raised from other baaks. 
As a result, restructured loans stand at around ¥24 trillion, far above the MoF's estimate of ¥ 
10 trillion. Our figure of restructured loans is calculated by taking 1) the value of problem 
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loans by the banks to the 30 or so major troubled non-banks; 2) the estimated value of 
problem loans to major companies other than the non-banks; 3) 50% of the loan assets at 
affiliated non-banks. It would take the 21 major banks several years to dispose of the bad 
loans as yet to be written off from or to be provisioned for this ¥41 trillion, using core 
earnings over time and unrealized profits on equities (note 4). 
It would take strong banks, such as Mitsubishi, Sanwa, Fuji and Sumitomo around three 
years to write off their bad debts using profits alone, and if they were to use unrealized profits 
as well, this would fall to 2.1 years. However, this scenario assumes that they use all the 
unrealized profits on TOPIX at 1,150, and does not take into account the possible fall in the 
value of collateralized real estate and the disposal cost of the bankruptcies of defunct financial 
institutions. In reality, the time taken to dispose of all the bad debts is probably longer than 
shown by the calculation. It is also impossible to ascribe a fair value to unpredicted liabilities at 
affiliated non-banks or related companies, so there may be banks in our calculation for which 
our time-frame is too short. 
(Please see Table 3: Speed of bad debt disposition at 21 major banks and Table 4: Affiliated 
financial institutions at 21 major banks) 
Note 4: Usable profit = (FY1995 estimated net operating profit - FY1995 estimated recurring profit) x 80% 
(20% represents various costs, eg, Tokkin, taxes etc). 
(P.s. FY 1994 disposal costs of bad debts at trust accounts may be added for trust banks) 
3. Financial System Reform Council: Disposal procedure that relies heavily on private 
sector earnings 
(1) Private sector financial institutions to foot the bill for disposing of bankruptcies 
In Japan there is no set formula for dealing with bankruptcies. As is clear from looking at the 
recently failed Cosmo, Kizu and Hyogo Bank, under the current system the regulators have to 
rush out to ask the related financial institutions to absorb the bankrupted banks and drum up 
the necessary funds everytime a bankruptcy occurs. Apart from the Deposit Insurance 
Corporation, there is no structure that happily provides the funds needed to dispose of the bad 
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debts of a bankrupt financial institution. It therefore takes a very long time to put together a 
framework for dealing with bankruptcies. A method of dealing with sudden failures is needed, 
as more bankruptcies are expected. The FSRC's interim report studies increasing deposit 
insurance premiums, reinforcing private sector financial institutions' obligations to offer 
support, and using public funds. A new formula for dealing with bankruptcies is likely to give 
administrators more freedom in terms of costs. At the same time, however, the FSRC stresses 
that "the use of public funds will be kept to a minimum", so it seems to be aiming to force 
through a structure whereby more of the burden of the costs of bankruptcies falls on the 
shoulders of private sector financial institutions. Disposal support from private sector financial 
institutions includes financial assistance from the Deposit Insurance Corporation, earnings 
support from related financial institutions, waiver of loan principals by related financial 
institutions or direct investment in failed financial institutions. Hitherto, even if a failing 
financial institution is not necessarily affiliated, but where there is the slightest connection in 
terms of personnel, specified financial institutions have had to take on a considerable burden of 
the costs of disposal. Major financial institutions have become increasingly dissatisfied with 
these inexplicable demands for support. In the final report, therefore, the need for increasing 
the deposit insurance premium is likely to be stressed, a relatively easy pill to swallow. 
Outline of the FSRC's formula for disposing of a financial bankruptcy 
i) Institute a system which allows disposal to begin rapidly. 
Use objective yardsticks (such as the real equity capital ratio) to allow appropriate 
measures to be taken early. This would mean that when a financial institution's liabilities 
exceeded its assets in real terms, the Deposit Insurance Corporation could institute 
bankruptcy proceedings. The Deposit Insurance Corporation could be given jurisdiction 
over the wind-up of the financial institution in question as the administrator, allowing the 
process to go forward smoothly. This would stop the increase in costs that postponing 
the disposal entails. 
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ii) Increase the deposit insurance premium as a source of funds for the disposal cost of 
bankrupt financial institutions. 
In order to provide a source of fund for disposing of bad debts, the deposit insurance 
premium should be substantially increased. It should also be possible to levy an additional 
premium (special premiums) as and when necessary. 
iii) When financial support from Deposit Insurance Corporation is used, related financial 
institutions will be required to contribute funds for support 
Conditions for using financial support system at Deposit Insurance Corporation should 
be firstly that a financial institution needs to be formed as a designated recipient for funds 
(e.g., Tokyo Kyodo Bank), and secondly that related financial institutions should 
contribute as much as possible in terms of financial support. 
iv) The use of public funds is inevitable in order to protect the depositors, but in this case, 
the financial institution should be wound up and cease to exist 
When the use of public funds is unavoidable in order to protect the depositors, then so be 
it. However, no effort should be made to rescue the financial institution, shareholders, 
capital participants, management or employees. Therefore the financial institution is to be 
wound up. It should be noted that the use of public funds prior to bankruptcy is to be 
considered. 
Note, according to MoF's schedule, the FSRC's Financial System Stability Committee is to conclude its 
deliberations on disposals on bankruptcies (as well as on the housing loan companies) by the end of CY1995. 
This is to be used as a material basis for the relevant laws (Commercial Law, Civil Code, Bankruptcy Law) to 
be revised at the ordinary session of the Diet next year. The MoF expects it to take until around August 1996 to 
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complete the necessary groundwork to put this formula into effect. I 
(2) The MoF and financial institutions are considering raising the insurance deposit premium 
by 3-5 times from its current level of 0.012%. This 3-5 level was reached by working out how 
much is needed to return the ever-dwindling deposit insurance funds to the March 1995 level. 
In the US, this premium stands at 0.25%, over 20 times the rate in Japan. The MoF repeatedly 
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returns to the point that there is plenty of room for raising the insurance premium in Japan, 
and so it is hard to believe that the increase will be a mere 3-5 fold. Table 5 shows the amount 
of annual payments that would be made in deposit insurance premiums if the rate were 
increased from 3 times to 20 times. This shows that many financial institutions are paying ¥150 
billion to ¥1.5 trillion in deposit insurance premiums. In addition, the system allows a special 
premium payment to be levied if and when required. (Table 5: Increased burdens due to the 
premium hike at DICJ) 
(3) The burden on private sector financial institutions from recent bankruptcies 
The diagram shows the proportion of the costs that private sector financial institutions have 
had to bear in recent bankruptcies. Taking the average of Cosmo Credit, Kizu Credit and 
Hyogo Bank, private sector financial institutions are estimated to have had to carry over 90% 
of the burden. The necessity for using public funds has not yet gained full national consensus 
covering all financial institutions (with the exception of few categories), and private sector 
financial institutions are likely to continue to have to shoulder a high proportion of the burden. 
(Table 6: Cost distribution in disposal procedure of bankruptcies) 
4. The burden of support on private sector financial institutions: enough to soak up five 
times FY1995's increase in earnings 
The MoF is also considering withholding public funds if financial institutions do not contribute 
a sufficient portion of the disposal costs of bankruptcies. Whether private sector financial 
institutions would agree to take on such a burden in order to restore stability to the financial 
system depends to what extent the costs of disposing of bankruptcies expands. Depending on 
whether we use MoF's informal estimate of ¥50 trillion (note5), or UBS Securities' ¥75 
trillion, the cost over the coming five years works out at between ¥4-7 trillion, even assuming 
merger rescues. If this burden were taken on entirely by the 21 major banks, this would soak 
up 20-30% of their net operating profits over the next five years. Put another way, virtually all 
of the increase in net business profits at 21 major banks provided in FY1995 by the fall in 
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interest rates would flow back out of the companies for the next 5 years. If take-over and 
absorption by administrating banks could not proceed smoothly, then the equity capital of a 
healthy financial institution could not be used to dispose of a bankruptcy, and the burden on 
the major banks is likely to be far above this ¥4-7 trillion. (Table 7: Estimated cost of disposal 
procedure) 
Note 5. This figure was explained by the MoF at the conference for foreign financial institutions in July 
27th. 
(1) Scenario 1: bad debts at ¥50 trillion 
- Burden on private sector financial institutions is about ¥4 trillion at least. 
- Deposit insurance premium hiked 10-fold. 
- Maximum of ¥7 trillion of public funds needed for the agricultural-cooperative related 
financial institutions. 
At the MoF's estimates bad debts at ¥50 trillion, small and medium-sized financial institutions 
have a capital shortage to the tune of ¥12 trillion. If we exclude financial institutions related to 
the agricultural cooperatives, this falls to ¥4.5 trillion. In reality, if these small and medium 
financial institutions do not merge with each other, this shortage would swell substantially, but 
we shall ignore this for the purposes of this report. If we also subtract the amount of external 
funds that are going to be required for Cosmo, Kizu and Hyogo bank (¥1 trillion), we are left 
with¥3.5 trillion. 
If we assume that the private sector is going to have to provide 90% of the funds, as has 
been the case on recent bankruptcies, this gives a figure of ¥3.1 trillion in support from private 
sector financial institutions and from sources such as the Deposit Insurance Corporation. In 
order to keep the deposit insurance funds at the same level as at the end of March 1995, 
(around ¥870 billion) the private sector would have to provide around ¥3.8 trillion. In order to 
cover this from deposit insurance payments over five years, the insurance premium would have 
to be raised by something over 10-fold. This would soak up around 20% of the major 21 
banks' FY1996 net operating profits every year. This will all-too-quickly eat up the addition to 
net operating profits provided by the decline in interest rates in the first half of FY1995 (¥1.3 
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trillion). On the other hand, the use of public funds would be restricted to around ¥400 billion 
in infusions into small- and medium-sized financial institutions (excluding those related to the 
agricultural cooperatives). 
The above argument does not include the financial institutions related to the agricultural 
cooperatives. We exclude special cases such as the housing loan companies, because we 
assume that private sector financial institutions have no obligation to dispose of the financial 
institutions related to the agricultural cooperatives. This group of financial institutions' 
liabilities exceed its assets by around ¥2 trillion. If the "responsibility of the ownership of 
housing loan companies(Jusen)" is played up in disposing of the housing loan companies, and 
parent banks have to take on ¥2 trillion more in extra losses than applied in the "lenders 
liability principle", then this excess of liabilities over assets would be wiped out. If these are 
not all to be wound up, sufficient public or external funding would be required in order to 
keep some of their operations alive. This would amount to a maximum of ¥7 trillion, 
depending to a certain extent on how they are reorganized and rebuilt. 
(2) Scenario 2: bad debts at ¥75 trillion 
- Private sector burden at least ¥6.5 trillion 
- Deposit insurance premium increased 18-fold 
- ¥8 trillion in public funds needed for the agricultural cooperative-related financial 
institutions. 
If bad debts reach ¥75 trillion, the shortage of funds at medium and small financial institutions 
will rise to ¥15 trillion. However, this will rise to around ¥7 trillion if we exclude the financial 
institutions related to the agricultural cooperatives. Private sector financial institutions will 
have to bear 90% of the burden, and if the deposit insurance liability reserve is to be 
maintained at March 1995 levels, then the burden at the private sector financial institutions will 
reach ¥7 trillion (assuming the rescues are carried out through mergers). This would mean the 
deposit insurance premium would rise 18-fold, i.e., that around 30% of the 21 major banks' 
net operating profits would be soaked up for five years on write-offs on bankruptcies. A 
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maximum ¥8 trillion in external or public funds would be needed for the ¥10 trillion capital 
shortage at the financial institutions related to the agricultural cooperatives. 
(3) Under the ¥75 trillion scenario, what does the capital shortage of the 21 major banks 
imply? 
Both of the above simulations take the optimistic underlying assumption that rescue mergers 
will take place. As long as we stick to the ¥40 trillion bad debt scenario, then there is no 
capital shortage for the 21 major banks, as has been often confirmed by the MoF. However, at 
¥75 trillion, even assuming unrealized hidden profits on equity holdings at ¥11 trillion, the 
capital shortage rises to around ¥2 trillion for the 21 major baaks in total. Bearing in mind that 
the major 21 banks hold as little capital as possible, this implies that if bad debts reach ¥75 
trillion, several of this group will in reality have liabilities in excess of assets. If share prices 
start to fall across the board once more, then this capital shortage will probably rise. 
5. MoF's thinking examined: changing slowly 
According to the MoF, bad debts have reached around ¥40 trillion, and financial institutions 
with the exception of agricultural financial institutions, credit cooperatives and the second-tier 
banks will need less than 5 years to write off bad debts under their own steam. Public funds 
will have to be used for disposing of insolvent financial institutions in these latter three 
categories (presumably with funds from private sector financial institutions as well), but the 
MoF stresses that this amount will be small, in spite of what the market expects. We analyze 
the MoF's comments below, and expound on the risks to this scenario for disposing of 
bankruptcies in the immediate future. 
(1) Liquidate bankrupt financial institutions 
The only thing that the regulatory authorities in the government's policy-making framework 
have made clear is the rule that "bankrupt financial institutions will be liquidated and cease to 
exist, therefore share certificates will be waste paper". The FSRC's interim report stresses that 
financial institutions where liabilities exceed assets should be wound up as early as possible, 
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and suggests at the same time that the use of public funds could be considered before making 
an ailing financial institution bankrupt. In other words, where it would prove difficult to wind 
up and eradicate a financial institution, steps could be taken that would not lead to bankruptcy, 
even if liabilities exceeded assets. 
(2) Hyogo Bank was too important to fail 
The Hyogo Bank has been allowed to continue its banking operation because the regulator 
judged that disposition costs would exceed the cost of recapitalization due to the large 
operating franchise value in terms of the number of borrowers and deposit accounts. It is 
expected that banks with considerable share in their own markets are unlikely to be liquidated 
in case of failure. However, even in this case, such banks would be considered to have 
technically disappeared (liquidated). Shareholders would lose their investments and the 
management would have to take responsibility for the failure. 
(3) Finance Minister said there would be no big failures for a while 
After the press conference following the bankruptcies of Hyogo Baak and Kizu Credit 
Cooperative, Finance Minister Takemura announced that "there would be no major 
bankruptcies for the time being". This can be interpreted as "for the time being, no major 
financial institutions will be driven into bankruptcy". This is because the Deposit Insurance 
Company's liability reserves have already been drained. As things stand at present, even if a 
large financial institution were to go bankrupt, it would be virtually impossible to put together 
the funds to cover the losses of the bankrupt company. If a major bankruptcy were to occur, it 
would further shake confidence in the financial system. We believe that no bankruptcies will 
happen for the next six months to a year. This is also related to the completion of a new 
formula for dealing with bankruptcies. Again according to the Ministry of Finance, the FSRC 
is to announce the framework for dealing with bankruptcies in its final report, due in 
December 1995. Revisions to relevant laws (Bankruptcy Law, Civil Code etc) are to be 
determined in the ordinary session of the Diet in 1996. The revisions will probably be passed 
by April at the earliest, and if everything proceeds according to plan, preparations should be 
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complete by summer 1996. According to the relevant authorities, large-scale ailing financial 
institutions will therefore start to be wound up in six months to a year from now. However, 
the possibility of one of the 21 leading-banks going under is still not considered in the 
authorities' scenario. Of course the mechanism of liquidity injection (eg, buying preferred 
stocks) under Art.25 of the Bank of Japan Act is still in force, and has been used by the 
authorities in their policy pronouncements supporting the financial system. 
(4) The threat inherent in postponing bankruptcies for a further year 
If clearing up potential bankruptcies is postponed by a year, this means that increasingly 
creditors that are currently only potential defaulters will become full-blown bad debts. In the 
current weak economy, the banks must be supporting many other creditors in ways other than 
lowering or foregoing interest payments, and in addition to their official restructured loans. 
Many of these subsidized creditors are related to the real estate market. If land prices do not 
stop falling and deflation reversed (among other things through landholding and capital gains 
tax reductions, both of which are now in the report of the tax commission due December 15), 
and moreover if transactions in the real estate market do not pick up, cash flow at these 
subsidized creditors is likely to deteriorate further. The baaks would have to grant additional 
funds in order to avoid the borrowers' bankruptcies, and this would increase the restructured 
loans at banks. If banks cannot continue supporting those borrowers, their loans would have 
to be classified as bad debts. As a result, the number of insolvent baaks would increase. 
Postponing disposal would raise the number of bankruptcies at baaks as well as the cost of 
disposing of insolvent banks. In a year's time, most of the major financial institutions will be 
under pressure from their own bad loans. The asset quality problem of several baaks' affiliated 
non-banks will worsen. As a result, restructured loans at banks are likely to increase sharply. 
Under these circumstances, shareholders are unlikely to allow baaks to sacrifice profits in 
order to help wind up other financial institutions. If this is the case, then the newly perfected 
method of winding up and disposing of a defunct financial institution is unlikely to proceed 
smoothly without the injection of sufficient public funds. 
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(5) The real meaning of "we will not cause the bankruptcy of one of the 21 leading banks" 
The MoF has made a number of official announcements emphasizing that it will not cause the 
bankruptcy of any of the 21 leading banks, claiming that "the principle of'too big to fail' will 
be applied to the 21 major banks", or "as regards the 21 major banks, we will not cause 
problems for related parties, such as market participants". The MoF repeatedly emphasizes 
the principle of "too big to fail" firstly because it believes that under its ¥40 trillion bad loan 
scenario, there is no reason for any of the 21 major baaks to fail. Secondly, because the 
economic costs of one of the leading 21 banks going under would be so great, any failure 
would need to be bailed out before it actually occurred. Thirdly, the head of the MoF's 
banking division has declared before the world that none of the major 21 banks will be driven 
into bankruptcy. For these reasons, a bankruptcy in this group is not permissible. If one of 
these had failed months ago, the market would have been able to deal with it calmly. This has 
now completely changed. If, in spite of the MoF's assurances, one of the 21 majors were to 
fail, the market would inevitably totter. However, it must also be recognized that the MoF has 
not guaranteed that it would never bankrupt one of the 21 majors. We consider that the MoF 
does not genuinely believe in its ¥40 trn scenario and is presumably also simulating a variety 
of bankruptcy scenarios of 21 major banks. The MoF's current position should be seen as 
expressing nothing more than that the failure of one of the major 21 baaks is the scenario least 
likely to take place in the near future, and the authorities should do everything possible to 
avoid it. However, we should bear in mind that postponing disposal procedures would cause a 
bigger bad debt scenario as well as insolvency even among the 21 major baaks. In addition, we 
should note that existing share holders would not be completely protected if public funds were 
used to purchase preferred stocks to bail-out the distressed baaks. The potentially very 
harmful outcome of such a scenario is causing a sense of crisis to develop. 
(6) The possibility of rescuing affiliates through mergers 
The recent commitment by the MoF carries far greater significance than the comment a few 
months ago that "Hyogo Baak cannot fail", and it should mean that over the next year or so, 
the MoF wants to avoid a bankruptcy among the major 21 baaks if at all possible. If its best 
15 
efforts fail, and a bankruptcy is inevitable, then the authorities' last line of defense is probably 
a rescue through a merger. As an improvement in efficiency cannot be anticipated through 
mergers of Japanese banks, the most likely outcome is that grouped financial institutions 
would bail each other out, while the second most probable scenario would be a merger aimed 
at deriving the merits of complementary business structures. 
(7) A disposal procedure that ignores fundamental rules will leave a bad taste 
The abrogation of responsibility and the protection of political interests have done much to 
prevent the jusen problem from being addressed sooner. Regulators will now probably try to 
solve the jusen problem through various procedures that will have to be tested for their 
effectiveness. Although it is important to try to find answers to the problem as quickly as 
possible, should procedures that neglect basic disposal rules (by providing the agricultural co-
operatives with undue political support) be adopted the effects could do more than simply 
increase the unease surrounding the Japanese financial system. Importantly, such procedures 
could force the tacit acceptance of similarly "exceptional" cases in the future. A window of 
opportunity is beckoning: through removing insolvent financial institutions from the market, a 
rational approach to the problem could be a vital step towards creating a stronger and more 
stable financial system. 
16 
Table 1: Bad debts at 21 Major Banks 
17 
Table 2: Japanese Financial System Short of ¥18 trillion in Capital 
0 0 
Table 3: Speed of Bad Debt Disposition 
Table 4: Affiliated Financial Institutions at Major Banks 
20 
Table 5: Increased Burdens on Banks due to the Premium Hike at Deposit Insurance Corporation 
Table 6: Cost distribution in disposal procedure of bankruptcies 
Table 7: Simulation of Disposal Costs of Bankruptcies 
en 
